ISSN
1393-614X Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy Vol. 8 2004.
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WHO IS THE “MUSIC-MAKING SOCRATES”?
Stefan Lorenz Sorgner
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Abstract
In this article, I wish to show that Kaufmann
was right, when he claimed that “nobody has ever found a better
characterization of Nietzsche” than his own, when he talked about the
“music-making Socrates” in the Birth of Tragedy. Firstly, I make some
general remarks on the Birth of Tragedy. Secondly, I analyse Nietzsche’s
understanding of music in the Birth of Tragedy. Thirdly, I describe the
particular conception of “Socrates” as Nietzsche develops it in The Birth of
Tragedy. Lastly, I bring these two concepts together, showing that there
are various parts of Nietzsche’s mature philosophy which demonstrate a
correspondence between the qualities of the “music making Socrates” and the
qualities of the later Nietzsche. In this way, I establish that the later
Nietzsche is very similar to the “music-making Socrates”, whom he mentioned in
his Birth of Tragedy.
In
this article,1 I wish to
show that Kaufmann was right, when he claimed that “nobody has ever found a
better characterization of Nietzsche” (Kaufmann, 1974, p 395) than
his own, when he talked about the “music-making Socrates” in the Birth of
Tragedy. Kaufmann, however, only put forward this proposition without
explaining the meaning of the concept of the “music-making Socrates” or showing
in what respect it corresponds to Nietzsche’s endeavours. This is what I do on
the following pages. Thereby, it becomes clear that the concept of the
“music-making Socrates” corresponds to the mature Nietzsche and the philosophy
which he defends from Thus spoke Zarathustra onwards. In addition, this
comparison enables me to show that Nietzsche’s philosophy within his three
periods is less divergent than has been argued. A clear distinction of
the three periods has been given by Hollingdale. In the first period
(1865-1876), Nietzsche’s “inner life, and a good deal of his outer life, was
dominated by Schopenhauer and Wagner” (Hollingdale, 1973, p 44). During his
middle period (1876-1883), he mainly put forward “reflections touching on the
whole gamut of European culture whose controlling tendency is a destructive
analysis of cultural values” (Hollingdale, 1973, p 45). The latest period
(1883-1889) can be described as “continual inventiveness, in respect both of
ideas and of literary style” (Hollingdale, 1973, p 45).
Firstly, I make some general remarks on the Birth of Tragedy. 2 Secondly, I analyse
Nietzsche’s understanding of music in the Birth of Tragedy. Thirdly, I
describe the particular conception of “Socrates” as Nietzsche develops it in The
Birth of Tragedy. Lastly, I bring these two concepts together, showing that
there are various parts of Nietzsche’s mature philosophy which demonstrate a
correspondence between the qualities of the “music making Socrates” and the
qualities of the later Nietzsche. In this way, I establish that the later
Nietzsche is very similar to the “music-making Socrates”, whom he mentioned in
his Birth of Tragedy.
1. GENERAL REMARKS ON THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY
In the Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche distinguishes three gods. These
gods are Socrates (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 83), Dionysus (Kerenyi, 1976;
Otto, 1965), and Apollo (Zeitler 1900, p 26-30). Each of them governs a special
sphere of the world, 3
and since they govern the world, they are also present in humanity. When they
are effective in human beings, these gods turn up as instincts (Nietzsche,
1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 90/99/112). Instincts determine the actions of man. The
fact that Nietzsche identifies gods and types of instincts might initially be astonishing;
however, if one takes into consideration that instincts are responsible for all
human action for Nietzsche, it might be less so, because gods usually stand for
a certain conception of “the Good”, and thus a basis for ones own actions.
Nietzsche’s three different gods are related to three types of culture, 4 for if many people of a
society act in a certain kind of way or are governed by the same type of
instinct, then that society is formed according to the corresponding
principles. Socrates stands for the Socratic-Alexandrian culture, Apollo for
the artistic-Hellenistic culture, and Dionysus for the tragic-Buddhist culture
(Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 116). In Nietzsche’s conception, it can be the
case that one god can mainly determine a culture, as it used to be the case
with Apollo in the Homeric age, and with Dionysus in the pre-Hellenic age (Silk
& Stern, 1981, p 185). It can also be the case that a synthesis of two gods
can bring about a culture, as it used to be the case with Apollo and Dionysus,
when with Aeschylus tragedy was at its height, or with Apollo and Socrates,
when Euripides killed tragedy. However, Nietzsche defends this philosophy of
culture only in the Birth of Tragedy. He does not use this classification
of types of culture in his mature philosophy. In his later writings, Dionysus,
for example, could no longer stand for the Buddhist culture, for then Dionysus
stands for an anti-nihilistic force, whereas Buddhism represents a nihilistic
religion (Sorgner, 1999, p 71-116). After these introductory remarks about the Birth
of Tragedy, I can now come to the second section.
2. MUSIC
In the Birth of Tragedy several types of music are mentioned. 5 In general music is linked
to Dionysus, which means that music is the most Dionysian of all the arts.
However, there are types of music which are properly Dionysian, and others
which are also strongly Apollonian (Schmidt, 1991, p 13-17). Yet, music only
has a strongly Apollonian aspect only, if the melody and structure of the
musical work was determined by the words to which it was set, as it was with
the folk songs of Archilochus (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 48-52). This type
of music is only an imitation of proper music. Proper music for Nietzsche is
always solely related to Dionysus (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 25-30), who
is the god of the original unity of the world. By referring to this original
unity, which is full of contradictions, permanently changing, and unapparent
(Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 38-42), Nietzsche alludes to Schopenhauer’s
metaphysics. However, it would be wrong to claim that in the Birth of
Tragedy Nietzsche is simply rephrasing Schopenhauer’s philosophy (Kaufmann,
1968, p 296-299; Young, 1992, p 1-57). There are three significant differences
between Nietzsche’s and Schopenhauer’s position. (1) According to Schopenhauer
instrumental music is the highest type of art, but this is not the case for
Nietzsche. 6 Yet, both
Nietzsche and Schopenhauer attribute great importance to music. (2) Nietzsche’s
conception of the good life is not Schopenhauerian. Schopenhauer proposes the
denial of, or escape from, the will as an ideal, whereas Nietzsche embraces the
will and all the pains and pleasures related to it, clearly pointing out that
“only as an aesthetic phenomenon are life and the world justified eternally”
(Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 47). (3) Schopenhauer distinguishes the realm
of causality and freedom. In Nietzsche there is only one realm in which one
finds both chaotic and orderly forces (Böning, 1988, S. 2-3).
According to Nietzsche, Dionysus stands not only for the
self-contradictory, permanently changing original unity, but also for all the
drives of this original unity. These drives are not only effective in the whole
of the original nature, but they also determine the actions of human beings,
and in addition, they are responsible for one particular type of art created by
human beings, namely, music. Music is related to this original unity, because
it too is flowing, and permanently changing. Surely, one could object that
while one is playing music the score does not change. This is one of the reason
there cannot be a purely Dionysian art. A more important reason is that all art
is created by man and therefore it necessarily belongs to the realm of
appearance, since human beings partly exist in this realm. For analogous
reasons there cannot be a purely Apollonian art, because men and all of their
creations also have to be a part of the Dionysian unity. Even in the most
Dionysian of the arts there has to be something which remains stable, which in
the case of music is, e.g., the score, in the same way as in a work of a
typically Apollonian type of art, like sculpture, there has to be change. One
might wonder where the aspect of change is to be found in a sculpture. If a
sculpture was not subject to change, and therefore purely Apollonian, it would
have to remain the same forever – like a Platonic form. However, due to the
change in the world, i.e. due to Dionysus, even every sculpture has to fade
away eventually. Yet, is music indeed the most flowing of the arts? Poetry
could also be considered as permanently flowing and changing because it too
needs to be read or performed, just as music needs to be played. Nietzsche
acknowledges the similarity between the poet and the musician (Nietzsche,
1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 43). Actually, these two types of artist were often
identical in Ancient Greece. However, what makes music slightly more Dionysian
is that music uses tones, whereas poetry is made out of words, as words have a
higher degree of order, and of abstraction than tones. The higher the degree of
abstraction, the closer something is to the principio individuationis which
is opposed to the Dionysian unity. Therefore, music is a more Dionysian type of
art than poetry, and as there is no other type of art which is more Dionysian,
this is the first reason why music is the most Dionysian type of art. Yet, it
is not only the aspect of change which makes music Dionysian. There are other
aspects as well.
The fact that the contradiction and pain which is present in the
original Dionysian unity is represented very well by proper music is the second
reason why Nietzsche links music with Dionysus. Dissonances that are painful to
our ears represent contradictions with respect to the tonal system, in the same
way as consonances correspond to the tonal system. When Nietzsche proposed this
view of music, he had a very high estimation for Wagner and his works,
regarding them as the perfect expression of music (Fischer-Dieskau, 1974, p
40-57). The dissonances Nietzsche had in mind were the ones from the prelude to
Wagner’s Tristan and Isolde that was first performed in Munich in 1865.
This prelude is one of the most important pieces for the development of 20th
century music. At this point in the history of composition, the process of the
dissolution of tonality is at a crucial stage, and it leads directly to the
compositional order of Schönberg. Since with this piece Wagner distances
himself from the principle of the tonal order, and embraces the dissonances,
and Nietzsche regards Wagner’s music as the highest kind of music, Nietzsche
has good reasons for linking proper music to Dionysus.
Besides the flowing and contradictory aspects of music, there is the
aspect of intoxication and self-forgetfulness (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p
28-29). In contrast to arts such as drawing and sculpture, which appeal mainly
to the visual capacities of men, music has an effect on the whole body. Of
course, we mainly perceive music by means of our ears, but we experience music
always holistically, and when we listen to live performances of music, we
become especially aware of this. We hear music with our whole body, and we are
within the music when we enjoy a great performance. In these moments, it is
impossible for us to distinguish between our selves and the external world.
Music enables us to dissolve the boundaries of our individuated existence. This
is another reason why for Nietzsche music is the most Dionysian of all the
arts, for Dionysus also represents a unity, namely, the metaphysical original
unity of the world (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 38-39). Within that unity
the individuation principle is absent, and one cannot find any separate
entities there. The whole original world is unified. The closest we can get to
this state through art is through music, because when we listen to music we
also get embedded in the unity of sound, and we are no longer caught within our
limited self. Due to the flowing character, the contradictoriness of its
essence, and the unifying aspect of its effect on men, Nietzsche regarded music
- in its proper form - to be the most Dionysian of all the arts.
The last quality that I wish to point out concerning the realm of
Dionysus, and therefore indirectly also of music, is that men cannot survive,
if they are only governed by Dionysian instincts (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1
p 57-71). This is an insight which is significant to Nietzsche’s later
philosophy. For Nietzsche, the realm of Dionysus is the truth, or the original
unity of everything. Since we cannot survive with Dionysus alone, he concludes
that the truth is destructive for men (Sorgner, 1999, p 71 – 96). In this way,
he questions the value of truth for our lives. Nietzsche expresses this thought
most clearly, when he talks about the myth of Oedipus (Nietzsche, 1967-1977,
Vol. 1 p 64-71). Oedipus solves the riddle of the sphinx, and thereby solves
the riddle of nature, and grasps what our world is like. However, the myth
makes clear that the very person who solves this riddle, also has to be the one
who murders his father and marries his mother, which in the end leads to his
own destruction. The one who solves the riddle of nature is doomed to
experience the dissolution of all individuation in the unity of nature. This
interpretation of the famous Oedipus myth expresses Nietzsche’s doubt that a
culture which is predominantly Dionysian promotes the good life for the people
of the respective society. It is also the reason why Nietzsche praises the
culture that is brought about by the synthesis of the Dionysian and the
Apollonian forces, for the Apollonian aspects enabled men to justify their
lives immanently, and the Dionysian aspect provided them with a suitable
balance, as Dionysian unity for Nietzsche represents the truth that in the end
affirms itself in all orderly creations. This was the scheme of the immanent
Greek theodicy (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 34-38).
In short, proper “music” implicitly represents the original unity of the
world which is contradictory, without individuality, permanently changing in
all respects, and unbearable for men (Sorgner, 1999, p 71 – 96). To understand
the concept “music-making Socrates”, however, we also have to grasp Nietzsche’s
understanding of Socrates in the Birth of Tragedy. I discuss Nietzsche’s
concept of Socrates within the Birth of Tragedy in the following
section.
3. SOCRATES
Socrates, as portrayed by Nietzsche, is a figure who is very different
to Dionysus. During most of his life Socrates was the personification of a
theoretical man (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 98). He practiced neither
music, nor poetry, nor did he have a high opinion of either. Only when he was
in his death cell did he start to discover his musical side. Nietzsche
attributes great importance to this observation (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p
92-96). From this brief description alone we can see that Nietzsche’s Socrates
is very much influenced by Plato’s, for it was in Plato’s Phaedo that
this story of Socrates was told Plato (Phaedo 60c-61d). However, it will
soon be clear that Nietzsche’s Socrates is far from identical with Plato’s.
Still it is much closer to Plato’s than it is to Xenophon’s or Aristophane’s
Socrates who are the other major literary versions of Socrates. 7
Nietzsche himself in the Birth of Tragedy claims that his
Socrates is not supposed to be identical with the historical, that his Socrates
is a god (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 81-88; Hildebrandt, 1922, p 31) – die
Gottheit[…] war[…] ein[…] Dämon, genannt S o k r a t e s (Nietzsche, 1967-1977,
Vol. 1 p 83). Besides Apollo, and Dionysus, he is
the third major deity who can determine the actions of human beings. I now
analyse for which types of actions Socrates is responsible.
Socrates is introduced in the Birth of Tragedy as the daemon who
influences Euripides in his way of constructing tragedies (Nietzsche,
1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 81-88). As Socrates was the personification of the
theoretical man (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 98), he influenced Euripides in
such a way that, according to Nietzsche, Euripides no longer just created the
tragedies unconsciously as Aeschylus did, but dedicated himself to the analytic
study of tragedies before he wrote them. He had to understand what the older
tragedians were doing, he had to be conscious of the order of the tragedies,
and he had to make a plan, and stick to it. This is what was Socratic about Euripidean
tragedies. According to Socrates, one has to have knowledge to be virtuous, and
according to Nietzsche, Euripides applied an analogous principle to his
tragedies: Something has to be understandable
to be beautiful (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 81-88). Nietzsche refers to
this attitude as “aesthetic Socratism” because Euripides wished to establish
Apollonian beauty by means of Socratic reason. Before Euripides, tragedy was
always linked to an insight into the Dionysian original unity. Euripides brought
about the death of tragedy because proper tragedy needs a Dionysian grounding
which means that it needs to be based on the insight that the world is
self-contradictory, that it is permanently changing, and that in the end we do
not receive any further reward for all the pain we have to bear during our
lives, which are all aspects absent from Euripidean tragedies. Euripides was
the reason for the death of the great synthesis of Apollo and Dionysus, but he
brought about the beginning of the collaboration between Apollo and Socrates
whereby the Socratic element was the more effective [“aesthetic Socratism”
(Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 85)]. The reign of the Socratic-Alexandrian
culture, according to Nietzsche then, was present until the nineteenth century,
revealing itself in the importance of the typical traditional operas before
Wagner (Nietzsche (1967-1977), Vol. 1 p 120-129). Nietzsche thought that the
end of that type of culture was near, he believed that Wagner could bring about
a rebirth of tragedy, which would be a very significant step for the
development of a predominantly tragic culture out of the German spirit, and he
regarded Luther (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 147), Bach (Nietzsche
1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 127), Beethoven (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 127), Kant
(Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 128), and Schopenhauer (Nietzsche,
1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 128) to have been strong forces in favour of the
re-establishment of a tragic culture. Kant, for example, attacked the Socratic
culture because he showed that it is impossible to grasp the essence of the
world, the thing-in-itself. Schopenhauer, on the other hand, is an opponent to
Socratism because he showed that our reason and understanding were brought
about by the will to life which itself is completely irrational and chaotic. In
this way, these two thinkers undermined the unconditional faith in the
possibilities of reason (Bowie, 1990, p 206), and understanding
which are linked to Socrates (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 92-96).
However, as the cultural progression always includes continuities, “the advent
of something post-Socratic which would include Socratic elements was necessary”
(Dannhauser, 1974, p 87). Later, I come back to what Nietzsche thought
about the possible future development of our culture. Now, I dedicate myself
further to the study of the concept “Socrates”.
Socrates is the god of reason and understanding, according to whom one
has to have knowledge to be virtuous, and virtue again is essential for
happiness (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 92-96). Knowledge refers to knowledge
of the truth as corresponding to the world. Here we can see the greatest
difference to Dionysus. From the aforementioned it follows that, according to
Socrates, knowledge of the truth leads to happiness, and that therefore the
truth is good for us. Yet, the happiness Socrates is talking about can only be
reached in a transcendent world. This is not stated explicitly in the Birth
of Tragedy, but it is necessary to read him in this way. The reasons are as
follows. Firstly, Nietzsche himself says in some unpublished notes that from
Socrates on Greek philosophy is the preparation for Christianity (Nietzsche,
1967-1977, Vol. 12, p 202). As one of the main elements of Christianity
is the promise of an eternal, fulfilled afterlife, the above statement provides
us with a good reason to think that Nietzsche attributes such an afterlife
theory to Socrates also. Secondly, Nietzsche regularly refers to another
excerpt from Plato’s Phaedo where Socrates, just before his death, asked
Crito to sacrifice a cock to Asclepius (Plato’s Phaedo 118a; Nietzsche,
1967-1977, Vol. 6, p 67 & Vol. 3, p 569-579). In these passages Nietzsche
always sees this utterance as an indicator for Socrates regarding life in this
world as a disease, which is not worth living, and from which he is saved via
his death. This is a plausible interpretation, as Asclepius is the god of
Health and people normally sacrificed a cock when they were cured from a
disease (Taylor, 1998, p 23). Given that Socrates believed that life in this
world is a disease, he cannot have expected to reach happiness in this world.
Yet, he did hold that virtue leads to happiness. Therefore, we can conclude
that Socrates believed in another world in which the promise of happiness is fulfilled.
The third reason in favour of the above interpretation concerning the world in
which Socrates expects to reach happiness is that this interpretation would
provide him with a genuine reason to reject Socrates, as he does in the Birth
of Tragedy, when he accuses him of the death of tragedy. The fact that
Socrates is the personification of the theoretical man cannot be the reason
Nietzsche rejects him, as theory, reason, and understanding enable man to
survive, in the same way the Apollonian forces enable man to survive, and
Nietzsche is full of praise for Apollo, as he knows that only as an aesthetic
phenomenon our lives can be justified (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 47). 8 Therefore, Nietzsche needs
to have had another reason for partly rejecting Socrates, 9 and given the above reflections I am forced to
conclude that Nietzsche rejected Socrates because he regarded him to have
believed in the afterlife in a transcendent realm. Nietzsche objected to this
belief, as for him Dionysus represents the truth, and this implies that a
Socratic afterlife in the other world can never be reached, and that in this
way all tragic elements which are necessary for a this-worldly life affirmation
get excluded. He does not attack Socrates because his position is a delusion,
but because his position is life-denying, as it excludes the tragic elements.
For Nietzsche the tragic elements are important, as they imply that the
worldview presented is only this-worldly, which for him is a personal
necessity. Socrates’ belief in a happy afterlife is also the reason Socrates is
not afraid of death.
However, there is one aspect of the character of
Socrates which seems to contradict all the knowledge Socrates himself puts forward,
for he defends the proposition that he is special because he knows that he does
not know anything (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 89).
This claim firstly seems to go against everything which was said before, like
his claim that knowledge leads to happiness, and secondly it seems to be
self-contradictory, as this claim also seems to apply to the utterance itself.
However, it has to be read differently. Socrates wanted to express that all
propositions can possibly be doubted, and that there are no propositions of
which one can be certain of in respect to a correspondence to reality. Although
he was aware of this, Socrates had to see the world in the way it is portrayed
in his positive views. What distinguishes him from the other human beings, who
also see the world in their own way, is that he was well aware that all
propositions can be doubted. This is his reason for thinking that he knows more
than others do. Socrates became aware of the contingency of all knowledge by
examining all world views by means of his reason. For himself, he kept the
above mentioned world view and principles, as they were the one which reason
enabled him to hold. So there is an aspect of Dionysus to be found within
Socrates, but it is of secondary importance with respect to his positive views,
e.g., afterlife, virtue leads to happiness.
What Socrates reached by claiming that he is the only one who knows that
he does not know anything is a new and higher estimation of knowledge
(Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 89). In this way, he turned knowledge into
something extremely rare, precious and difficult to reach, which again makes it
very tempting, desirable, and sought-after. With Socrates, truth becomes
something valuable. This is what makes Socrates the perfect personification of
the theoretical and scientific man for Nietzsche, as these fields aim for the
truth. In addition, science and theory are always linked to reason and
understanding. Nietzsche’s understanding of what is scientific and theoretical
is extremely wide, and one must not think only of the natural sciences when he
talks about science. Everything which is predominantly governed by reason and
understanding is scientific for Nietzsche and one of the major characteristics
of science is consistency. With these remarks I wish to conclude section 3 and
focus on the last section of this article.
4. NIETZSCHE AND THE MUSIC-MAKING SOCRATES
After having analysed the concepts “music” and “Socrates” in Nietzsche’s
Birth of Tragedy, we can now bring these two concepts together to get a
grasp of what exactly the expression “music-making Socrates” exactly means.
However, I wish to add something about the role of Socrates first.
Since Socrates never appreciated tragedy, i.e. music and poetry, during
most of his life, and as he only went to the theatre when the plays of the
logical poet Euripides were performed, it was strange that in his death cell
Socrates suddenly devoted himself to music and poetry. According to Nietzsche,
then an important part of Socrates character, which he normally oppressed, was
set free (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 92-96). As a result of this observation Nietzsche questions whether a music-making
Socrates could ever found a culture, and even whether such a figure could be
the founder of the forthcoming culture in Europe (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 1
p 102-108). While he was writing the Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche
believed and hoped that a new tragic culture will appear in Europe and that it
will be formed by the great German spirits like Wagner and himself. However, in
his late period, from Zarathustra on, he no longer had such a hope in
the German spirit, and he also had a significantly different view with respect
to the philosophy of culture. Yet, I will show that the concept of the
“music-making Socrates” actually corresponds to the mature Nietzsche himself.
If we bring together the essence of the concept “music” and “Socrates”
from Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy, what do we end up with? As we saw in the
first section, ‘music’ is related to Dionysus who stands for the tragic world
view, which means that there is only this world, which in its essence is full
of change, is self-contradictory, unified, and unbearable for men. What is
tragic about it, is that everything eventually has to fade away again, and that
everything is permanently changing in some respect, which implies that all
things always have to be suffering at least a little bit because if something
changes, it has to overcome something else, so that it can change, and
overcoming is always painful. The essence of the concept “Socrates”, however,
is that he is the founder of a culture in which it is believed that it is best
for men to reach a basis for their lives by means of the faculties of reason
and understanding, and that therefore only theoretical and scientific men can
reach a good life. If we bring these two concepts together, then we have to say
that the concept of the “music-making Socrates” corresponds to a founder of a
tragic and Socratic culture. A tragic and Socratic culture is one in which men
believe only in this one world which is full of change and pain, but which is
explained and justified by means of scientific thinking, i.e. the application
of the faculties of reason and understanding. As a result one would end up with
an immanent, tragic, but scientific world view, and I show next that this is
exactly what Nietzsche was putting forward during his mature period.
When discussing Nietzsche’s mature philosophy, I refer to my own interpretation
of it which is published under the title Metaphysics without Truth: On the
Importance of Consistency within Nietzsche’s Philosophy (Sorgner,
1999). Here, I only give a short summary of the relevant points in
question. I begin with the musical or Dionysian aspects.
Firstly, Nietzsche’s mature world view is a tragic one which means that
it is a this-worldly world view. There is nothing beyond the appearance of a
thing, for “a thing is the sum of its effects” (Sorgner, 1999, p 55). These
effects are permanently interacting with one another, for each thing is a
power-quantum consisting of will and power. These aspects can only be thought
separately, but they can never actually exist independently of one another. So
all effects are power-quanta, and we ourselves are also just a set of
power-quanta. Nietzsche’s metaphysics is exclusively this-worldly.
Secondly, as all power-quanta are permanently interacting with one
another, there is no end to striving for any organism, which is another
expression for power-quantum. Whenever an organism strives, it has to overcome
others, which permanently causes some pain to each organism. So each thing is
permanently suffering, although this pain does not necessarily always have to
be so big that one has to be aware of it (Sorgner, 1999, p 56).
Thirdly, each of the finitely many power-quanta, which can only appear
in certain sizes, has a certain perspective on the world. Someone would know
the truth about the world, if he took in all perspectives at all times. So all
perspectives taken together would constitute the truth. However, no one is able
to do so, according to Nietzsche. Yet, what is important for our purpose is
that, if all perspectives taken together constituted the truth, then again the
truth would be self-contradictory (Sorgner, 1999, p 81-87). So far it should
have become clear that both the philosophy of the mature Nietzsche as well as
the concept of the “music-making Socrates” includes that the truth is
self-contradictory, everything is permanently in modified change, this world is
the only world, there is no afterlife, and we permanently have to suffer at
least a little bit of pain.
Let me come to the Socratic aspects of Nietzsche’s
later philosophy. Firstly, Nietzsche was using reason and understanding to
develop his philosophy (Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 5 p 18/55). He was doing so
not because these faculties provide men with the truth but because human power
quanta developed them in order to survive (Sorgner, 1999, p 80/93), so by using
them he knew he could bring about a world view which enables men to at least
survive — and by combining this method with his further insights (e.g. world as
will to power), he wished to make his world view even life-enhancing
(Nietzsche, 1967-1977, Vol. 6 p 175-176; Vol. 13 p 266). The metaphysics of the
eternal recurrence of everything show the great importance of reason within
Nietzsche’s philosophy (Sorgner, 2001, p 165-170). All the various premises
necessary for this concept do in fact appeal to the intellect. The world has to
consist out of a finite amount of energy, because we cannot think an infinite
amount of energy. As we cannot think infinitely many states of energy, power
quanta can only take in a finite amount of energy states. What is interesting
in this respect is that this insight corresponds to the insight of modern
physicists. According to which, energy can only appear in a quantity which is
the integral multiple of the Planck constant which also implies that energy can
only take in a finite amount of states if the total amount of energy is finite.
These are only two of the premises necessary for the argument which leads to
the eternal recurrence of everything, yet they clearly reveal the rational
basis of that metaphysics.
Secondly, Nietzsche developed a metaphysics of the will to power
(Sorgner, 1999, p 34-58) which, due to its resemblance to Darwinian
anthropology and also because it is very biological, appeals to scientifically
minded people. It is biological because the world consists of many organisms
for Nietzsche. These organisms are will to power, and therefore act and develop
according to what they themselves think is best for them. So the phylogenetic
development of human beings according to Nietzsche is also based on a striving
for power. In principle it functions very similar to Darwin’s theory of
evolution, with the difference that according to Darwin the basic drive is the
will to survive whereas in Nietzsche it is the will to power.
Lastly, Nietzsche hoped to be the founder of a culture so that “whole
millennia will swear their most solemn oaths” in his name (Sorgner, 1999, p
124). All of these aspects again do correspond to the qualities of the concept
“Socrates” of the Birth of Tragedy, for it was essential for both
Socrates and Nietzsche to use their faculty of reason and understanding to
establish their world view, that the theories with which they ended up can be
regarded as scientific, and thirdly that both figures are supposed to be
founders of a culture.
This comparison between the concept of the “music-making Socrates” and
the philosophy of the mature Nietzsche has clearly revealed that Kaufmann was
correct, when he said that he regards the concept of the “music-making
Socrates” to be the best characterization of the mature Nietzsche, although
Kaufmann did not specify this expression any further himself. 10 In all their essential points the concept of the
“music-making Socrates” and the philosophy of the mature Nietzsche do correspond
with one another, as we have just been able to realise. 11 In addition to this, this essay should have made
it obvious that Nietzsche both in his first, as well as in his last period had
a very high estimation of science, which traditionally has not been recognised
sufficiently among Nietzsche scholars. In the Birth of Tragedy he did
attack Socrates, and blame him for the death of tragedy, but this does not mean
that he disrespected the faculty of reason and understanding, or the scientific
type of man in general, but only that he objected to the claim that by using
reason one becomes virtuous and that virtues enable man to reach a good life
within the transcendent world. It was the otherworldliness which he attacked,
for it posits a world which according to his own Dionysian truth does not
exist, and which causes men to refrain from leading a good life within this
world. However, Nietzsche did acknowledge the power and value of reason by
wondering whether the “music-making Socrates” will be the founder of the next
European culture. In his mature philosophy, it becomes even more obvious that
Nietzsche was embracing science, and applying it for his purposes. This cannot
only be seen in his biological, and rational metaphysics. According to Lou
Salomè, Nietzsche even thought about studying physics in Paris in order to
prove the eternal recurrence of everything scientifically (Sorgner, 1999, p
135). This should make it clear that both the early and the mature Nietzsche had
a higher respect for science than has traditionally been thought among
Nietzsche scholars.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Babich,
Babette (1996) “Nietzsche and Music – A Selective Bibliography” in New
Nietzsche Studies 1 , p 64-78.
Barker,
Stephen (1992) Autoaesthetics: Strategies of the Self after Nietzsche,
Humanities Press International, New Jersey, London.
Böning, Thomas (1988) Metaphysik,
Kunst und Sprache beim frühen Nietzsche, Walter de Gruyter, New
York/Berlin.
Bowie,
Andrew (1990) Aesthetics and Sucjectivity from Kant to Nietzsche,
Manchester University Press, Manchester.
Dannhauser,
Werner J. (1974) Nietzsche’s View of Socrates, Cornell University Press,
Ithaca, N. Y.
Dahms, Walther (1921) Die
Offenbarung der Musik: Eine Apotheose Friedrich Nietzsches, Musarion
Verlag, Munich.
Figal, Günter (1995) Sokrates,
C. H. Beck, Munich.
Fischer-Dieskau, Dietrich
(1974) Wagner und Nietzsche, Deutsche Verlags Anstalt GmbH, Stuttgart.
Gründer, Karlfried (Ed.)
(1969) Der Streit um Nietzsches ‘Geburt der Tragödie’ – Die Schriften von E.
Rohde, R. Wagner, U. v. Wilamowitz-Möllendorf, Georg Olms, Hildesheim.
Guthrie,
W. K. C. (1971) Socrates, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Haeußling, Roger (1999) Zur
Rolle von Kreativität heute: Versuch eines Diskurses zwischen
Gegenwartsphilosophie, Nietzsches Denken und aktueller Musik, Könighausen
und Neumann, Wuerzburg.
Hildebrandt, Kurt (1922) Nietzsches
Wettkampf mit Sokrates und Plato, Sibyllen-Verlag, Dresden.
Hollingdale,
R. J. (1973) Nietzsche, Routledge & KeganPaul, London/Boston.
Jaehnig, Dieter (1975) Welt-Geschichte:
Kunst-Geschichte – Zum Verhältnis von Vergangenheitserkenntnis und Veränderung,
Verlag DuMont, Schauberg/Köln.
Kaufmann,
Walter (1974) Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 4th ed.,
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Kaufmann,
Walter (1968) Tragedy and Philosophy, Princeton University Press,
Princeton.
Kerènyi,
Karl (1976) Dionysos, translated from the German by Ralph Manheim,
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und die Kunst, A. Francke Verlag, Tuebingen und Basel.
Nehamas,
Alexander (1998) The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to
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Geburt der Tragödie: Schriften zu Literatur und Philosophie der Griechen,
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Nietzsche Handbuch – Leben-Werk-Wirkung, Metzler, Stuttgart.
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Walter F. (1965) Dionysus, translated from the German by Robert B.
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Der Beginn des philosophischen Dialogs, Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, Reinbek
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Helmut (Ed.) (1997) Nietzsche und die Musik, Europäischer Verlag der
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John (1991) Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy, University of
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David S. (1976) ‘Musical Settings of Nietzsche Texts: An Annotated Bibliography
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1. This
article includes material from my article “Nietzsche” which was published in
the essay collection Musik in der deutschen Philosophie: Eine Einführung
edited by S. Sorgner and O. Fürbeth [Stuttgart: Metzler Verlag, 2003].
2. The best commentaries to the Birth of Tragedy
are: von Reibnitz (1992); Nietzsche (1994); Silk/Stern (1981). All relevant
articles on the Birth of Tragedy from the time of its publication can be
found in the following collection: Gruender (1969).
3. Compare
Barker, 1992, p 9-10. Barker correctly stresses that in the Birth of Tragedy
Apollo is not subsumed into Dionysus, but he has forgotten to point out that
Socrates exists as a separate force.
4. Jaehnig regards Socrates to be the absolutitised
version of Apollo (Jaehnig, 1975, p 163). This position has to be false as
Nietzsche clearly distinguishes Apollo, Socrates, and Dionysus (Nietzsche,
1967-1977, Vol. 1 p 116).
5. A good introduction to the topic “Nietzsche &
Music” can be found in: Ottmann, 2000, p 479-480, and Pöltner/Vetter 1997. The
following three articles excellently summarise which composers were influenced
or inspired by Nietzsche: Musical Settings of Nietzsche Texts: An Annotated
Bibliography (I) (Thatcher, 1975). Musical Settings of Nietzsche Texts: An
Annotated Bibliography (II) (Thatcher, 1976). Musical Settings of Nietzsche
Texts: An Annotated Bibliography (III) (Thatcher, 1986). Babette Babich compiled
a useful bibliography on the topic “Nietzsche and Music” (Babich, 1996). Also
see Dahms (1921) and Haeussling (1999).
6. If Meyer was right who holds that Dionysian art alone
is life affirming (Meyer, 1993, p 83), then the position of the early Nietzsche
would be identical to that of Schopenhauer, as Dionysus represents music.
However, Nietzsche regards a duality with the Dionysian elements as a necessary
constituent as the highest type of art, as can be seen in Nietzsche’s praise of
the works of art based on the synthesis of Dionysus and Apollo.
7. A good introduction to the various literary
treatments about Socrates and their problems can be found in the essay
“Introduction: The Paradox of Socrates” by G. Vlastos [Vlastos, 1971, p 1 –
22). A brilliant overview over various perspectives on Socrates in German gives
Wolfgang H. Pleger (Pleger, 1998). Some other studies of Socrates which can be
recommended are the following: Guthrie (1971); Figal (1995); Taylor (1999).
8. It is important to stress that Apollo and Socrates
stand for different forces. Apollo represents the harmonious order within
single things, whereas Socrates stands for the harmonious, and consistent order
of the world as a whole.
9. Nietzsche’s attitude towards Socrates has always been
ambivalent (Nehamas, 1998, p 155).
10. Sallis also remarked that “Nietzsche
cannot have merely have written of the turn but also must have written from out
of the turn. His writing must itself already have entered into the turn
toward the music-practicing Socrates” (Sallis, 1991, p 133). However, he did
not give a clear analysis of why this is the case either.
11. According to Hildebrandt “the
music-making Socrates” was merely an allegory of Nietzsche’s hope (Hildebrandt,
1922, p 37). This is true for the time at which Nietzsche wrote the Birth of
Tragedy, but he fulfilled the hope himself in his later work.
Copyright © 2004 Minerva
All rights are reserved, but
fair and good faith use with full attribution may be made of this work for
educational or scholarly purposes.
Stefan Lorenz Sorgner teaches
philosophy and applied ethics at the Friedrich-Schiller-University in Jena. He
is the author of Metaphysics without Truth – On the Importance of Consistency
within Nietzsche’s Philosophy (Munich: Utz Verlag, 1999), and he is also the
co-editor of the following three essay collections: Sorgner, Stefan
Lorenz/Fürbeth, Oliver (Ed.): Musik in der deutschen Philosophie: Eine
Einführung. (Stuttgart:
J. B. Metzler Verlag, 2003); Knoepffler, Nikolaus/Schipanski, Dagmar/Sorgner,
Stefan Lorenz (Ed.): Wartburgtagung: Humanbiotechnologie als gesellschaftliche
Herausforderung. Alber Verlag (Freiburg: Alber, to be published); Sorgner,
Stefan Lorenz/Birx, H. James/Knoepffler, Nikolaus (Ed.): Eugenik und die
Zukunft. Alber Verlag (Freiburg: Alber, to be published).
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